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Unveiling the Plot in Thought Experi-
ments and other Fictional Works 
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According to a recent philosophical claim, “works of fiction are thought experi-
ments” (Elgin 2007: 47), though there are relevant differences, as the role of spoilers 
shows—they can ruin a novel but improve the understanding we can gain through 
a thought experiment. In the present article I will analyze the role of spoilers and 
argue for a more differentiated perspective on the relation between literature and 
thought experiments. I will start with a short discussion of different perspectives on 
thought experiments and argue that the mental-model view and the conception of 
games of make-believe are most promising for developing the present analogy. 
Then I will assess the similarities and differences between thought experiments and 
other works of fiction. I will focus on the role of spoilers and, more generally, on 
the foretaste context, of which they are part. This context guides readers of literary 
works of art to draw their attention to the literary and aesthetic quality of the text. 
In the case of thought experiments, on the other hand, it (i) prompts them to accept 
the presence of fictional elements in worldly-cognitive works and (ii) draws their 
attention towards cognitively relevant elements of the story. A discussion of Bor-
ges’ Pierre Menard in the last part will show that literary works of art become 
thought experiments if they are embedded in an appropriate foretaste context. 
Spoilers, thus, unveil that even works which—due to their length or plenty of de-
tail—usually are not considered thought experiments, can perform similar cogni-
tive functions.  
 







A brand-new mystery story of your favorite author has just been published. As 
often, several plot anticipations begin to appear online. You cannot keep curiosity 
at bay and instantly try to find out who the new murderer is—a weak moment 
that just ruins your enjoyment of the long-awaited work. This love-hate relation-
ship results from two conflicting tendencies: (i) the desire to immediately release 
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the tension and find out how the work ends and (ii) the desire to enjoy a good, 
unspoiled read, to work your way through the text step by step and slowly unveil 
the solution. This is particularly evident in the case of criminal novels or movies, 
where suspension builds up, holding the reader in tension, and twist turn their 
expectations upside down. It is the main purpose of works of this kind to keep the 
reader in suspense—and we admire them for that. Does this point apply to all 
works of fiction? If we look at thought experiments as fictional narratives,1 spoil-
ers seem to lose all their destructive aura and turn into a most helpful tool. 
According to a recent claim, at least some works of literature are thought 
experiments (Carroll 2002; Davies 2007, 2018; Elgin 1996, 2007, 2014, 2017, 
2019). This claim sheds light on a much-debated question: can fiction provide 
knowledge? It may be obvious that Nobel-laureates such as Wisława Szymborska 
and Gabriel Garcia Márquez wrote literary masterpieces of outstanding cultural 
and cognitive value. But it is less obvious how exactly these or other works of 
fiction impart relevant knowledge about the real world to the reader. Catherine 
Elgin provides a straightforward explanation: “works of fiction are thought ex-
periments” (2007: 47). Thus, if a work of fiction can widen our cognitive horizons, 
it will do so in the same way a thought experiment does. This suggestion is, how-
ever, only the tip of the iceberg that hides, on a more profound level, a series of 
problems. Its plausibility depends essentially on the conception of thought exper-
iments that one endorses, i.e. which position one opts for in the lively debate on 
the nature of thought experiments that is immersed in the icy waters, as it were: 
how can thought experiments—which are never actually carried out and often 
involve a fictional narrative—add to our empirical knowledge or contribute to our 
scientific understanding?  
I will develop my argument in two steps. First I will briefly recall the main 
positions in the current debate on thought experiments and suggest that Elgin’s 
claim is best suited to the view that thought experiments are mental model rea-
soning and works of literature are games of make-believe. Then, I will present 
some analogies between works of literature and thought experiments and show 
how the role of spoilers can help us to shed a new light on the differences between 
them. I will argue that spoilers can be useful in thought experiments and scientific 
papers, but counter-productive in many genres of fictional works as they ruin the 
reader’s experience. It will be helpful to focus on the context in which spoilers can 
be embedded. There are works of fiction that can be used in two different ways, 
as literary works or as thought experiments, depending on context; in the first 
case, the author of the work will avoid spoilers so as not to diminish the aesthetic 
quality of the work, while in the second case spoilers can be helpful as they guide 
the reader’s attention and so enhance the cognitive efficiency of the work. 
 
2. Thought Experiments and Games of Make-Believe 
2.1 How Do Thought Experiments Work? 
Let’s start with thought experiments. They give rise to an epistemological puzzle 
(Kuhn 1977; Davies 2007) that can easily seem paradoxical: they can and often 
do enhance our understanding of reality even though they do not provide new 
empirical data. In recent debate at least three main accounts can be distinguished: 
 
1 Why should not we? Thought experiments are devices with narrative structure in which 
fictional events dynamically occur (Egan 2016, Nersessian 1991, Willée 2019). 
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the Argument View, the Platonic Perception View, and the Mental-Model Reasoning 
View. Let’s have a quick look at the three positions. 
John Norton claims that, behind their aesthetic and narrative features, 
thought experiments always ground themselves in deductive or inductive argu-
mentations (1996, 2004). Each thought experiment can, therefore, be reduced to 
an argument with no epistemic loss: aesthetic and narrative features are only used 
for illustrative purposes. In an antithetical way, James Brown argues for a Pla-
tonic solution, taking thought experiments as “telescopes” directed to the realm 
of abstract entities (1991, 2004). The way in which we gain knowledge concerning 
this kind of artifacts has nothing to do with empirical experience. Rather, it is 
grounded on an intellectual perception—a special activity that allows us to grasp 
independent and outside-from-space-and-time laws of nature. 
The attraction of the Platonic view lies in the fact that it recognizes thought 
experiments as a peculiar source of knowledge, different from empirical data-
gathering or logical reasoning. Norton’s position, on the other hand, has the vir-
tue of parsimony, while Brown can do justice to the point that thought experi-
ments are both essential and peculiar. 
While for Norton, thought experiments are only “arguments in disguise” and 
can easily be replaced by them, the Platonic Perception View attributes a central 
relevance to them, but does invite for serious concerns: first, it does not provide a 
reliable account of how abstract entities can be grasped in intuition; second, the 
unexplained use of the metaphor of “intellectual perception” raises suspicion as 
it comes along with inappropriate empirical commitments. Norton’s Argument 
View, on the other hand, fails to account for imagination-based thought experi-
ments, such as cases where you have to imagine a certain shade of blue or those 
in which you put yourself in someone’s else position to assess moral judgement. 
Supporters of the Mental-Model Reasoning view can combine the strengths of 
the other two positions and avoid their problems by arguing that thought experi-
ments provide cognitive advancement grounded on experience in virtue of an es-
sential use of imagination rather than collecting new empirical data. In virtue of 
imagination, simulation, and memory, thought experiments can reconfigure pre-
viously obtained empirical data in new ways, prompting new experience-related 
knowledge (Gendler 2010; Miščević 1992, 2007; Nersessian 1991, 1992, 1999, 
2018). This solution takes up central insights from Ernst Mach and Philip John-
son-Laird. The former argues that thought experiments use an instinctive kind of 
experience stored in memory but not yet propositionally articulated (Mach 1976). 
According to the latter we use mental models in the understanding of narrative 
texts, in which we experience some sort of contemplation of a fictional situation 
(Johnson-Laird 1983). 
In conducting a thought experiment, we deal with a hypothetical state of af-
fairs in a “What would happen if…” style. We reflect the consequences a counter-
factual, fictional state of affairs would have. In doing so, the reader employs many 
non-linguistic cognitive resources, such as her familiarity with her own body, spa-
tial intuitions, and forms of tacit knowledges (Know-how). In thought experiments, 
we imagine seriously: it is thanks to the meticulousness with which these cognitive 
resources are used, with respect to the constraints designed by the author, that a 
thought experiment can play a role that is analogous to that of a real experiment. 
Successful thought experiments invite the reader to imagine scenarios that allow 
her to draw true, or at least plausible, conclusions regarding the real world. 
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Tamar Gendler, who also draws on Mach’s account, further develops this 
position, using the terms “mental representation” (2010: 47). She argues that 
thought experiments are moments in which one is “contemplating the imaginary 
case in question” using “a store of unarticulated knowledge of the world which is 
not organized under any theoretical framework” (Gendler 2010: 39). 
It is worth noting that the authors here considered explicitly state that their 
theories regard scientific thought experiments only. According to Rachel Cooper, 
this is a “strategy of caution” (2005: 329): there are different types of thought ex-
periments, and scientific ones seem prima facie easier to classify. Gendler does 
state, however, that the only difference between scientific and non-scientific 
thought experiments lies in the fact that the first concern “features of the physical 
world” (2010: 45). For these reasons, I believe that a unifying account of thought 
experiments is to be preferred. In this article I will consider thought experiments 
in general. 
 
2.2 Games of Make-Believe and Pierre Menard 
The role of imagination and its limits have been of interest in the entire history of 
philosophy. In what follows—to spoil the choice right away—I will rely on Ken-
dall Walton’s account, which provides an interesting explanation of the analogy 
between works of literary fiction and thought experiments. In particular, Walton’s 
notion of fictional world—which can be compared to “mental model”, a “space” 
within which the development of a fictional state of affairs is imagined, will be of 
interest. 
For our purposes, one highlight of Mimesis as Make-Believe (Walton 1990) is 
the concept of principle of generation—a more or less explicit rule that gives struc-
tures to a fictional world. For example, a bunch of bored children decide to play 
together, and imagine that the apples on the kitchen-table are hand bombs. From 
the beginning of the game, and until its conclusion, the principle of generation 
“apples are dangerous hand bombs” is pretended to be true and the children begin 
to behave accordingly. All children who accept this principle of generation be-
come players attuned to the same fictional world—a micro-world within which 
apples are fictitious hand-grenades. In light of that, a player who eats an apple (i) 
either pretends to commit suicide, (ii) proposes a further principle of generation 
and pretends to defuse or hide the bomb, (iii) does not play correctly, (iv) or is just 
hungry and decides to “detune” from the fictional world and “re-attune” to the 
real world. 
According to Walton, principles of generation are central also in other con-
texts: figurative sculptures, paintings, and works of fiction prompt the view-
ers’/readers’ imagination. Principles of generation are, thus, best understood as 
rules that prescribe what to imagine and which every player has to respect in order 
to take part in the game. According to this conception, imagination is not an un-
regulated, creative faculty but “it is a realm in which the play of ideas is bound by 
constraints the imaginer sets” (Elgin 2014: 227). 
However, the mere desire to comply with a rule is not enough to act in ac-
cordance with it (Wittgenstein 2009: §202). An external criterion is needed. In 
Walton’s perspective, props as warrants of the correctness of a game perform this 
function. A prop is an object that makes it possible to retrieve principles of gener-
ation and give coherence to a fictional world. The children involved in the apple-
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bomb world rely on real apples to generate the fictional truth that there are hand-
grenades on the kitchen table. The apples, thus, serve as external criterion in this. 
Similarly, also fictional texts could be understood as props in games of make-
believe: Jorge Luis Borges’ short story (1999) generates the fictional truth that 
Pierre Menard planned to re-write Cervantes’ Don Quixote, just like John Searle’s 
article (1980) made it fictionally true that the person in the room can answer ques-
tions formulated in Chinese without mastering the language—and so made it pos-
sible that all readers take part in the same game of make-believe, the Chinese-room 
thought experiment. All props work independently from particular acts of imagi-
nation, but not in isolation: a (more or less) explicit agreement, in the stipulation 
of the principles of generation that guide the game, is necessary to start it and to 
make sure that all can enjoy the same fiction work or thought experiment—that 
might deviate from one another only in minor details (Meynell 2018: 503). This 
shows that Walton’s theory has a well-marked normative and social dimension. 
According to Walton, thus, the great works of literature are fine props that 
prompt the readers’ imagination in different ways: by surprising them, by making 
them reflect on determinate matters or on the psychology of a character, or by 
making them identify with strange beings, etc. Sometimes, a work of literature 
can be used to show, to test, or to argue for a certain theory or hypothesis. 
Thought experiments understood as mental model manipulation seem to work 
precisely in that way: thanks to a set of prescriptions the author of a thought ex-
periment invites the readers to imagine a certain fictitious state of affairs and so 
designs a model that shows something meaningful. 
A potential critique of the position that I have discussed so far could emerge 
from a recent suggestion, formulated by Fiora Salis and Roman Frigg (2020), ac-
cording to which only propositional imagination is necessary for the performance 
of thought experiments and games of make-believe. The contents of propositional 
imagination are propositions. It has three main features: (i) one can freely imagine 
any proposition one desires, (ii) an imagined proposition imposes inferential com-
mitments similar to those imposed by a proposition that is believed, and (iii) to 
imagine a proposition does not require one to believe it. The authors argue that 
games of make-believe are cases of propositional imagination which, in addition 
of the above features, are (iv) social activities structured through (v) normative 
aspects. Such a classification is inspired by Gregory Currie (1990), who argues 
that activities of make-believe are propositional attitudes similar to belief and de-
sire. Salis and Frigg, following Currie, suggest that to play a game of make-believe 
might arouse mental images, but this is not a necessary feature, and therefore it is 
not a relevant element of make-believe. 
According to Salis and Frigg, the five features that identify make-believe 
listed above are also shared by thought experiments: to imagine a set of proposi-
tions that describe a hypothetical scenario, to imagine their possible inferences, 
and to imagine the conclusion that is to be drawn from such a set of imagined 
propositions do not require the contemplation of a quasi-visual situation. The 
conclusions of thought experiments, therefore, presuppose the possession of lin-
guistic competences, rather than pre-theoretical information stored in memory or 
any kind of “phenomenological” imagination. 
Walton is less reductive on this point; he distinguishes different types of im-
agination: “imagining a proposition, imagining a thing, imagining doing some-
thing” (1990: 13) and states: 
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Props prescribe nonpropositional imaginings as well as propositional ones. They 
do not thereby generate fictional truths, but the mandated nonpropositional imag-
inings are a distinctive and important part of our games of make-believe (Walton 
1990: 43). 
 
Although the term ‘make-believe’ suggests some resemblance to beliefs, and there-
fore to propositional attitudes, Walton does not privilege propositional imagina-
tion over other forms of imagination: depending on the fictional world that is pre-
sented in them, games of make-believe can involve different forms of imagination. 
Mental model reasoning seems to provide further evidence for Walton’s lib-
eral position, as it underlines the fact that we can gain meaningful insights from 
different imaginative resources, such as imagine-that-color (“imagining a thing”) 
and imagine-that-feeling (“imagining doing something”, or “imagining being af-
fected by something”). Hume’s notorious thought experiment of the Missing Shade 
of Blue (1999: 9f.) and Thomson’s Dying Violinist (1971: 48f.), essentially involve 
non-propositional imagination: the visual imagination of a particular nuance of 
blue in the first case and the imagination of feeling empathy for a character, in the 
latter. Since both types of imagination cannot be reduced to propositional imagi-
nation, the attempt to reduce the imaginative activities required by thought exper-
iments to propositional imagination must fail. 
We are now in a position to come back to Elgin’s claim concerning an anal-
ogy between literature and thought experiments. Borges’ Pierre Menard, Author of 
the Quixote seems to substantiate this view: it invites the reader to consider a coun-
terfactual scenario, adopting the sober and direct style of a literary review. As a 
work of literature, the text exemplifies Borgesian humor and an excellent mix of 
essayistic and narrative genre. As a thought experiment, it develops an argument 
in favor of the thesis that a work of literature cannot easily be separated from the 
historical context and that extrinsic features of the work (partially) determine its 
identity-criteria (Bailey 1990; Danto 1981; Goodman and Elgin 1988; Lamarque 
2009). 
We should be cautious, however. The example discussed, which is right in the 
Goldilocks zone between works of literature and thought experiments, is likely to be 
more an exception than a prototypical example. It is true that works of literature 
and thought experiments have important analogies, but we have to take their differ-
ences into account to avoid a petitio principii. I will return to Pierre Menard later in 
this paper, when I will discuss the role of spoilers in works of fiction. 
 
3. Exploring the Analogy 
There are apparent similarities between literary works and thought experiments. 
In what follows, I will discuss four points that illustrate the strength of Elgin’s 
analogy: (i) both develop their plot in a narrative, (ii) in indeterminate or incom-
plete contexts, (iii) are subject to reality constraints, (iv) and both can provide an 
advancement of the reader’s understanding. Elgin’s analogy has its limits, how-
ever, as I will try to show in section 3.2, where I will come back to the phenome-
non of spoilers.  
 
3.1 Similarities 
(i) First of all, both works of literature and thought experiments develop a nar-
rative. Both describe series of events that are causally related or groups of 
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similar but causally unrelated events.2 It is worth noticing that thought ex-
periments are usually presented in medias res, which likens them to standard 
experiments, that are also conducted in medias res (Elgin 2014: 225), while 
other fictional works may use different narrative devices depending on 
what type of game of make-believe they are meant to induce. 
(ii) Second, narrated events always occur in partially indeterminate or incom-
plete contexts. Unlike possible worlds, at least in David Lewis’ concep-
tion, 3  works of literature and thought experiments leave many aspects 
open. It is neither true nor false that Pierre Menard has a brother who is a 
musician, or that the Society of Music Lovers in Judith Thomson’s thought 
experiment publishes a journal that is dedicated entirely to Chopin’s style. 
These details are not mentioned in the text and, therefore, play no role in 
the games of make-believe that they prompt. Ignoring details of a fictional 
world that are not present in the plot helps the author to control the sce-
nario and to highlight the ones that she wants to draw attention to. We find 
a similar strategy in real experiments conducted in laboratories: also here 
it is important to suspend all irrelevant elements that could distort results 
and lead the reader astray (Elgin, 2014: 222)—and in thought experimen-
tation this selective ability is at its best use. 
(iii) Moreover, elements of the real world are typically carried over to the fic-
tional worlds that are described in works of fiction or in thought experi-
ments. This is what Stacie Friend calls the reality assumption (2017: 31), 
i.e. the assumption that readers of fictional works usually import aspects 
of the plot from the real world. It is true in the story that Pierre Menard 
has got a brain, or that the Society of Music Lovers is not composed by a 
bunch of domesticated monkeys, even if Borges or Thomson did not ex-
plicitly mention any of these facts. This point does not conflict with (ii). 
Although it suggests that we add details not present in the plot, these are 
details that we take for granted in our world-view and that are not specific 
of a given state of affairs. Moreover, even though some aspects are im-
ported from the real world, other are still left indeterminate. 
(iv) One last analogy is about the advancement of understanding: both thought 
experiments and works of literature can show, defend or confute a hypoth-
esis. Powerful works of literature can have a more lasting impact and make 
the reader to reflect on their themes in later moments in time. Engaged 
novels like Orwell’s Animal Farm, dystopian ones like Huxley’s Brave New 
World, and existential novels such as Camus’ The Stranger are particularly 
apt to prompt the reader to think about the meaning of life, moral choices, 
the responsibility of technology etc. In the case of thought experiments, it 
is more obvious that they can serve cognitive goals—after all, this is the 
main purpose for which they have been devised. 
Notwithstanding these analogies, however, we can note a relevant difference be-
tween literature and thought experiments, which becomes particularly evident 
 
2 In Magnolia, directed by Paul Thomas Anderson in 1999, the plot is developed in an al-
ternating intertwining that made school in contemporary cinematography. The stories nar-
rated are almost totally isolated from each other but connected by various themes, includ-
ing that of cancer. 
3 Lewis argues that every assertion regarding to a possible world has truth-value (1986). 
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when we look at the way in which the narrative is presented; i.e. at aspects of 
aesthetic appreciation and of literary style. I will focus on one of these aspects in 
the next section. 
 
3.2 A Significant Difference: Spoilers 
Let me illustrate how the role of spoilers differs between thought experiments and 
other works of fiction by discussing two emblematic examples, the movie The 
Sixth Sense (directed by M. Night Shyamalan in 1999) and Judith Thomson’s 
aforementioned thought experiment of the Dying Violinist. Attention: spoiler alert! 
In the following discussion, the plot of The Sixth Sense will be revealed. If you do 
not want to ruin your experience of the movie, you better skip the next two para-
graphs. 
In The Sixth Sense, the child psychologist Malcolm Crowe deals with an ap-
parently common case: a 9-year-old boy called Cole feels strongly anxious in 
every life context. Dr. Crowe takes the child to heart but Cole confesses that his 
problem is not psychological: he claims to possess the extraordinary capacity to 
see dead people. Crowe works hard to give the boy a life-purpose and put him in 
a condition to accept his special capacity. The film ends with a masterful plot-
twist: we realize that Dr. Crowe had already died and was dead throughout the 
movie. His interaction with Cole were possible only due to the latter’s paranormal 
gift. Throughout the movie, the spectator was longing to find out whether or how 
Dr. Crowe was able to heal Cole from his anxieties—just to find out, at the end, 
that Dr. Crowe was dead and it was Cole who comforted the wandering dead all 
the way long. 
Shyamalan’s movie illustrates well the destructive effect a spoiler can have 
on the spectator’s experience: one of the central pleasures of the film lies in the 
fact that the final twist turns upside down the storyline of the entire film and forces 
the spectator to interpret several scenes of the film in a completely new light. One 
might even want to see the film a second time, just to see whether the entire plot 
was consistent with the new interpretation and whether there were hidden clues 
that could have given the surprising final twist away. This second viewing would 
afford, if any, a very different kind of pleasure. If a potential viewer has never 
watched that movie but already knows that Crowe is a wandering dead, both kind 
of pleasure would be ruined. The first because the surprise element, which makes 
the movie so interesting, would be lost; the second because who knows about the 
final twist throughout the movie will interpret all relevant scenes “correctly” and 
is deprived of the enjoyment of performing a “check-reading”, i.e. to go back in 
memory to the relevant moments and reflect whether they are coherent with the 
new interpretation. 
It might be argued that a viewer who already knows about the final twist 
could still enjoy The Sixth Sense, appreciating different aspects of the movie, such 
as the photography, the way it is directed, or the performance of the actors. Yet, 
the enjoyment the movie was intended to arouse would be lost, the viewer would 
not deal it as a story, because “when you have negotiated the intricacies of the 
plot—when you have experienced the surprises, made the discoveries, had your 
expectations verified—you have realized the intentions of the novelist [or the 
screenwriter] qua story-teller” (Kivy 2011: 7f.). Peter Kivy suggests that works of 
narrative fiction can be enjoyed only once if read by the reader as a story to be 
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told. Further readings could not provide the same kind of pleasure.4 Accordingly, 
even though The Sixth Sense can be viewed focusing on scenography or photog-
raphy, or viewed a second time for a “check-reading”, it seems quite obvious that 
the main quality of the film is related to the enjoyment that results from the final 
plot-twist. Shyamalan’s movie is a particularly effective example for analyzing 
spoilers in fictions since it masterfully shows the destructive effect it can have on 
the experience of a work of fiction. 
Let me illustrate the role of spoilers in thought experiments with a short dis-
cussion of Thomson’s Dying Violinist. In this famous thought experiment the phi-
losopher asks you to imagine yourself waking up in bed next to a famous violinist 
who, as you learn right after your awakening, suffers from a kidney disease and 
risks dying. The Society of Music Lovers has kidnapped you because you have the 
same rare blood-type as the violinist and could, with your circulatory system 
pumping blood also through the violinist’s body, save the life of the violinist. The 
hospital director concisely states: to save his life, you have to stay connected to 
his body for nine months. At this point, Thomson asks the reader: “is it morally 
incumbent on you to accede to this situation?” (1971: 49). What should you do if 
the situation will last not for months but for years, or for the rest of your life? It 
would certainly be a kind action to save the violinist, but no one seems to be mor-
ally constrained to stay in bed and ruin her existence for saving another person’s 
life. This thought experiment invites the reader to imagine a fictional world de-
signed to conceive, by analogy, the possible relationship between a mother and 
her fetus, and to understand some moral implications of abortion that could easily 
be underestimated or neglected. 
In this paper, I am not interested in discussing this experiment’s moral or 
political implications, but in another question: if a person, who reads through the 
text and in doing so conducts the thought experiment in her mind, knows already 
about the final twist beforehand, would that ruin her experience or the effective-
ness of the thought experiment? I do not think so. Moreover, it seems that also 
Thomson would agree, since the paper in which the Violinist’s case is presented 
is called A Defense of Abortion. It just seems that with this title Thomson wants to 
get the reader “straight to the point”, without trying to hide the cognitive instances 
with which she elaborates her fictional story. Rather, she uses the “spoiler” to 
attract the readers’ attention and arouse their curiosity. 
This observation can be explained by the fact that every thought experiment 
is part of a broader argumentation or theoretical context—which we can call fore-
taste context—in which spoilers about the cognitive instances of the fictional work 
are presented and which, therefore, makes it easier for the reader to accept that a 
fictional narrative is embedded in a theoretical, scientific discussion.5 
It is possible to introduce in this context instructions that guide the interpre-
tation of the thought experiment and to communicate to the reader which aspect 
 
4 An exception to this point could be due to the viewer’s bad memory. If over time she has 
forgotten the plot, a new experience of the same movie would realize again its story-telling 
intentions (Kivy 2011: 8). 
5 Note, however, that spoilers are not a necessary element of a foretaste context. It can be 
generalized as the ever-present contextualization that embeds all texts. It may be more or 
less complex, contain spoilers or not, be marginalized or significant in order to serve the 
purposes of the author. Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyze the role that spoilers can 
play within any foretaste context. 
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of the narrative is salient for the argument. Even when the thought experiment 
leads to an unwelcome conclusion,6 knowing about it in advance does not ruin its 
effectiveness; on the contrary, spoilers can stimulate and guide a thought experi-
ment’s reading7—which marks an essential difference to other works of fiction. 
The role of spoilers, considered here as a narrative and epistemic device, is 
useful to unveil a significant difference between the narrative style of works of 
literature or movies on the one hand, and thought experiments, on the other. 
Whether or not spoilers can be an effective device depends on how the content of 
the narrative is presented: showing spoilers concerning the plot—or its extreme 
consequences—can guide the viewer’s attention, or block her emotional involve-
ment and enjoyment, depending on the purposes for which a work is used.8 
In this paper I suggest that it is in virtue of an effective foretaste context, in 
which we can read spoilers about claims and conclusions of a fictional state of 
affairs, that the author of a thought experiment succeeds in two aims: (i) justifying 
the presence of a fictional element within an essay with worldly-cognitive pur-
poses, and (ii) guiding the reader’s attention in order to put her in the condition 
to better understand which elements of that fiction are salient and which are not. 
The first claim becomes evident if we imagine the bewilderment of a reader who, 
while she’s struggling with an essay about artificial intelligence, suddenly comes 
across a paragraph regarding Chinese idioms and people locked up in isolated 
rooms.9 An out-of-the-blue employment of fictional stories is not so common in 
scientific essays, therefore an effective foretaste context is needed to make the 
reader accept the use of fiction in this kind of context. 
The second point highlights the role that the instructions provided by the 
author play in the reader’s interpretation of a thought experiment. Fictional texts 
often present multiple interpretative layers that result from different aspects of the 
work; clear-cut instructions can, thus, be helpful to put aside irrelevant interpre-
tations—at least, the ones that are irrelevant for the author’s cognitive purposes. 
If this strategy is applied, even fictional texts that were not designed as thought 
experiments can be illuminating. This requires us to put the aesthetic qualities 
aside and focus on those aspects that deepen understanding. 
A good example of these two points is, again, Thomson’s paper, in which 
the reader accepts the use of a short fictional story within a theoretical context 
because it is presented as a counterfactual situation about the main topic, thanks 
to the title and the style-formula “It sounds plausible [that a fetus could be a per-
son from the moment of conception.] But now let me ask you to imagine this” 
(1971: 48). The reader, thus, is guided to weigh the elements presented in the fic-
tional narrative: the fictitious fact of having been kidnapped by the Society of Music 
Lovers is hardly relevant, while the fictitious fact of staying in bed for exactly nine 
 
6 For example, a reader may be skeptical about Thomson’s argument but surprisedly con-
clude, after carrying out her thought experiment, that the author has got a point. 
7 Just briefly think about how much interest the question “do you want to know about that 
thought experiment which shows how computers cannot think?” can prompt. 
8 An “above board” presentation of what cognitive instances are actually in play could 
enhance the strength and understanding of an argument better than a plot-twist. This does 
not mean we always have to ignore emotive responses when our claims are epistemic, nor 
that emotions play no role in the constitution of beliefs or in the advancement of under-
standing (see Elgin 2002, 2008). 
9  Fortunately, Searle’s Chinese Room is well contextualized and does not confuse the 
reader—at least not for its being fictional. 
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months immediately stand out as salient. The spoiler in the title suggests that the 
thought experiment is presented with the aim to advocate women’s right to 
choose whether to carry on a pregnancy or not—this allows the reader to read the 
story through the interpretative lens intended by Thomson and to neglect, or at 
least bracket, alternative interpretations. 
Complementary to Elgin, who states that “[true descriptions can be] embed-
ded in a work of fiction, a context in which an author is free to take liberties with 
truth in order to serve his aesthetic ends” (2007: 43), I think it is important to note 
that the opposite situation can also occur. Just as it is possible that fictional works 
may contain true statements within them—so it is possible that worldly-cognitive 
works may contain fictional elements, if fictionality helps the author to pursue her 
cognitive ends. 
In addition, I suggest that, with an effective foretaste context, an author may 
be able to make a fictional story work like a thought experiment. This does not hold 
for any story, though: there must be a cognitively relevant and not overly ambigu-
ous content emerging from the narration. In literary works of art of this kind, spoil-
ers guide the reader’s attention, and focus it on internal argumentation present in a 
literary work, on plausible causal chains of fictional events, on a thesis shown in the 
work, rather than focusing on the aesthetic pleasure that is aroused by it. 
Note that it is still possible to perform a thought experiment without any pre-
vious spoiler about the plot and the cognitive instances involved. In these cases, if 
we cannot properly speak of “spoilers”, we can still find interpretative instructions 
that guide the readers’ attention. When the focus of the reader’s attention is guided 
“at a later stage”, she could—and probably will—do a “check-reading” of the 
thought experiment, just like in The Sixth Sense mentioned above, and check 
whether the interpretation is consistent with the fictitious state of affairs. 
Thus, the use of spoilers is not a necessary condition for carrying out a 
thought experiment, even though it is an interesting device. Could spoilers never-
theless be a sufficient condition for a text to be a thought experiment? It depends 
on what they are used for. If their purpose is primarily epistemic, the work is used 
as a thought experiment. Spoilers, however, can serve different functions: some 
deep spoilers of Pierre Menard can be helpful in a creative writing course as a vir-
tuous example. Thus, spoilers alone are not sufficient; they can fulfill different 
functions in the foretaste context of a work. 
 The point here is that a useful condition for using a fictional story with cog-
nitive purposes is a theoretical context that puts aspects like entertainment and 
suspense aside. The author’s instructions for the interpretation can be placed be-
fore or after the presentation of the fictional part, but, in order to render it more 
likely that the reader will accept the presence of a fictional story and avoid bewil-
derment, some spoilers can be helpful. Granted this, in the next section I will 
discuss in more detail an example of a short story that can work as thought exper-
iment by virtue of an effective foretaste context. 
 
3.3 Spoilers and Pierre Menard 
In section 2.2 I mentioned Jorge Luis Borges’ short story Pierre Menard as a good 
example of both a thought experiment and a work of literature. In the present 
section I will take a closer look at the work, analyzing how it presents itself and 
how it works in its original context. Finally, I will discuss the question of whether 
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an efficient foretaste context can “transform” Pierre Menard’s short story into a 
thought experiment. 
The cognitive force of Pierre Menard lies in its illustration of how two texts 
that are identical word for word can be considered two distinct works of art, if we 
consider elements such as the social, historical and cultural contexts, as well as 
the intentions of the authors. It will be useful to have a look at the way the story 
is presented and, with all due respect to Derrida’s claim,10 the author’s intentions: 
the text has the form of a short story and it has been published in a collection of 
short stories entitled Ficciones. 
The foretaste context in which the work is presented contains no spoiler. It 
seems that the author did not want to force a single interpretation onto the reader. 
In fact, we only need to know a little bit about Borges to understand the plausibil-
ity of this point: throughout his oeuvre, Borges play on ambiguity so effectively 
that this clearly contributes to its outstanding literary and aesthetic value. 
Nonetheless, the meta-narrative level in which Pierre Menard is developed 
makes it particularly versatile. If we focus on certain passages of the work rather 
than others,11 we can easily find an ontological theory that is presented in an aes-
thetically and cognitively successful way. These considerations have led some 
philosophers to take up Pierre Menard as a thought experiment, quoting it with the 
appropriate foretaste context. Let me give you some examples that illustrate this 
point as well as the potential of the appropriate foretaste context. 
Discussing the identity criteria of texts, Arthur Danto argues for the possibil-
ity that two works that are indiscernible are not identical with one another. With 
reference to Borges’ work, he writes: 
 
The possibility was first recognized, I believe, in connection with literary works, 
by Borges, who has the glory of having discovered it in his masterpiece, Pierre 
Menard, Symbolist Poet. There he describes two fragments of works, one of which 
is part of Don Quixote by Cervantes, and the other, like it in every graphic respect—
like it, indeed, as much as two copies of the fragment by Cervantes could be—
which happens to be by Pierre Menard and not by Cervantes. […] the books are 
written at different times by different authors of different nationalities and literary 
intentions: these facts are not external one; they serve to characterize the work(s) 
and of course to individuate them for all their graphic indiscernibility. […] Borges’ 
contribution to the ontology of art is stupendous: you cannot isolate these factors 
from the work since they penetrate, so to speak, the essence of the work (Danto 
1981: 33-36). 
 
Although Danto recalls the work with a different title, in this section we can see 
how he uses Pierre Menard as a thought experiment. He describes the text—with-
out any attempt to avoid spoilers—and uses it as an integral part of his own argu-
ment. If someone who has never read Borges’ work would come across this pas-
sage, probably all these spoilers and the argumentative context, in which it was 
 
10 The reference here is to the lucky slogan “there is no outside the text” (Derrida 1976: 
158). 
11 In the first part of the work, there is a long and ironic list of the visible work left by Pierre 
Menard, to be contrasted with his invisible fragment, the re-writing of parts of the Don 
Quixote. An effective foretaste context will take these elements to the background and guide 
the reader’s attention to another part of the story, where comparative analyses between 
Menard’s and Cervantes’ texts clearly illustrate the thesis at stake. 
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embedded, would tempt her to read it. It is worth noting that, in this case, the 
spoilers would not ruin the experience of the short story. On the contrary, they 
would add to its enjoyment: the ontological thesis shown in the story is the main 
point of its plot—at least, in this theoretical context—and there is no need for plot 
twists or unexpected surprises. 
Even more explicitly, Peter Lamarque uses Pierre Menard as thought experi-
ment in The Philosophy of Literature: 
 
Jorge Luis Borges’s witty short story “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” has 
come to epitomize, for philosophers, thought-experiments about works and texts, 
supposedly offering a powerful fictional exemplification of the view that distinct 
works can have identical texts. In the story, Menard, a fictional early-twentieth-
century Symbolist poet, has the ambition to write Don Quixote, not by merely cop-
ying the original, but by a fully inspired act of literary creation. Here is a key, and 
often quoted, passage from the story: 
It is a revelation to compare Menard’s Don Quixote with Cervantes’s. The latter, 
for example, wrote (part one, chapter nine): 
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, wit-
ness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future’s 
counsellor. 
Written in the seventeenth century, written by the “lay genius” Cervantes, this 
enumeration is a mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the other hand, 
writes: 
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, wit-
ness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future’s 
counsellor. 
History, the mother of truth: the idea is astounding. Menard, a contemporary of 
William James, does not define history as an inquiry into reality but as its 
origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what has happened: it is what we judge 
to have happened. The final phrases—exemplar and adviser to the present, and the 
future’s counsellor—are brazenly pragmatic. 
The contrast in style is also vivid. The archaic style of Menard—quite foreign 
after all—suffers from a certain affectation. Not so that of his forerunner, who 
handles with ease the current Spanish of his time. 
[…] Whether or not Borges’s story in itself provides adequate grounds for distin-
guishing work from text, it shows in effect the way that distinction could be main-
tained. A single text could be shared by two distinct works if certain conditions are 
in place: at the least, the works must have different properties and the texts must 
be produced by independent creative acts (Lamarque 2009: 74ff.). 
 
Unlike Danto, Lamarque adds two elements: he not only discusses the cognitive 
value of the work, quoting its most significant part; he explicitly refers to Borges’ 
text using the term ‘thought experiment’. Lamarque’s term is uncontroversial and 
does not hurt the reader’s common sense: the short story fits well within a theo-
retical and argumentative horizon that justifies its presence. 
Not all philosophers agree with the ontological thesis presented by Borges. 
Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin, for example, consider it with critical in-
tent, when they discuss the criteria of identity of a text and its relationship with 
different interpretations (1988: 60ff.). This clearly indicates that Goodman and 
Elgin tacitly treat Borges’ work as a thought experiment. After all, it is good prac-
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tice that a philosopher, who does not agree with the conclusion of a thought ex-
periment, challenges the fictional scenario or its interpretation.12 For Goodman 
and Elgin, therefore, Pierre Menard is a thought experiment that can raise a serious 
objection to their own claim and, thus, calls for discussion. 
Finally, George Bailey dedicates an entire paper to the ontological debate 
around the Pierre Menard’s case. He recognizes in Goodman and Danto the main 
argumentative poles, arguing that Borges’ story should be considered as a valid 
contribution to the ontology of artworks (Bailey 1990: 340). This shows the im-
portance of Borges’ short story, which has come to stand for a specific philosoph-
ical position within a prolific debate in contemporary aesthetics.  
It is important to note, however, that Borges does not use a spoiler in the 
story’s foretaste context to guide the reader towards a specific ontological conclu-
sion. It rather seems plausible that he has played with the absence of any interpre-
tative line, with the aim to prompt astonishment in the reader who, reading Pierre 
Menard, might wonder whether what she has just read is nothing but brilliant non-
sense or whether, perhaps, Borges has got a point. The philosophers considered 
above certainly accept the second possibility and use Pierre Menard in a context 
which, at the cost of unveiling the short story’s plot, gives more prominence to 
the thesis it can be taken to prove. 
This shows a central point. If we put Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote in a 
theoretical context which explicitly states the main point of its plot, the short story 
does not appear flawed. We would consider the argument to be properly devel-
oped—and might be surprised by how well it was written, especially when com-
pared to other thought experiments. 
Thus, Borges’ work can be considered both a literary work of art and a 
thought experiment, depending on the context in which it is presented and used. 
If we grant the lesson that Borges seems to illustrate in his short story, perhaps we 
could argue that there are two distinct works—a literary work of art and a thought 
experiment—that are identical word for word, but differ in context, purpose, style 
and have to be interpreted in different ways. The whole thing about anticipation 
and explanation of a plot’s main points therefore seems to be a constancy, and 
also an important literary device, in guiding the modes of access, interpretation 
and identification with which a reader approaches a fictional text in cognitive 
contexts. Although it has previously been argued that Pierre Menard is both an 
outstanding work of literature and an illuminating thought experiment, the 
“transformation” is not immediately established and we have to add some spoil-
ers, as well as to change the context of presentation of the short story, i.e. we have 
to change what I have called foretaste context, to make it really work as a thought 
experiment. 
It should be noted, however, that Borges’ short story is a most effective ex-
ample: it is particularly apt to become a thought experiment, since it is short 
enough and the main point of its plot can be easily recognized as a substantial 
thesis concerning the ontology of artworks. It is more common to find larger and 
more heterogeneous works of literature that cannot, if considered in their whole, 
act as thought experiments even though some of them might contain suitable pas-
sages that do. Even in these cases, the foretaste context has the task of guiding the 
 
12 In this context it can be interesting to recall that John Searle presents his thought exper-
iment of the Chinese Room Argument in connection with a discussion of several replies that 
have been raised against it (1980: 419-24). 
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reader to accept the author’s choice of a certain part of the text, and to focus her 
attention in order to bring out the cognitive instances that are so fundamental in 
thought experimentation, but that, without explicit instructions, can also serve 
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